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AFTERWORD: Antitrust and American
Business Abroad Revisited
David J. Gerber*
Kingman Brewster's exceptionally influential Antitrust and American
Business Abroad (1958) came to symbolize an era in antitrust law and in the
relationship of U.S. business to international economic activity. It gave
conceptual contours to a fundamental problem that had been only dimly
perceived before -- namely, the need to define the reach of U.S. antitrust
law.' In a masterful and much expanded third edition of the book, Profes-
sor Spencer Waller marks the transition to a new, very different, and far
more complex era in antitrust law and in its significance for international
business.2 We have only begun to recognize and grapple with the extent
and implications of these changes, and I here use these two books to under-
score some of their key features and implications.
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY ERA
For Brewster, the situation was relatively simple, and the problem was
straightforward. There was only one significant competition law in the
world -- U.S. antitrust, and the issue was how it should be structured and
applied. In many ways, the United States sat astride the world. The U.S.
government set the tone for much that happened in the non-communist
world, and U.S. economic interests tended to dominate international mar-
kets. This situation induced or at least encouraged American legal and po-
litical decision-makers to extend the reach of U.S. antitrust law to conduct
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1 KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD (1958).
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within the territory of other countries. After all, the U.S. had discovered the
value of antitrust, and it was "doing the rest of the world a favor" by using
it to shape international economic relations.
In the famous Alcoa case of 1945, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, sitting for the U.S. Supreme Court, ruled that U.S. law could be ap-
plied to conduct anywhere in the world if it was intended to affect the U.S.
and the Court in fact did so.4 Armed with this doctrinal tool, U.S. govern-
ment representatives, judges and scholars developed a policy of extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust law. The basic idea was that the U.S.
antitrust laws would provide the normative structuring mechanism for in-
ternational commerce, at least where effects on U.S. commerce were in-
volved. Brewster's book thus had one dimension, because international
antitrust law had one dimension. It was about the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. laws!
Brewster's great contributions were to identify the need for judicial
control of this exercise of U.S. power and to articulate a conceptual frame-
work for meeting that need. He developed the now famous "jurisdictional
rule of reason", which during the following was at the center of the dialogue
of international antitrust, particularly in the United States. This doctrine
calls for U.S. courts to balance the positive pro-competitive effects of ex-
traterritorial application of U.S. law against its negative effects on foreign
interests and U.S. foreign policy interests.
II. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT
The situation today differs in fundamental ways from what existed
only a few years ago. The applicable rules, the institutions that influence
decisions, the skills and knowledge needed to practice effectively in the
area -- all have changed, often radically.
Even the basic terms of the discussion are either new or have acquired
different meanings and significance. The term "antitrust" is no longer, for
example, the central term in the discussion. "Antitrust law" is now merely
understood as the U.S. version "competition law"; a term that is generally
used in other countries to refer to laws designed to deter restraints of com-
petition. "Antitrust law" has thus vacated its central position in the dis-
course of international antitrust law.
If we look at the normative structure within which international busi-
ness decisions are made -- i.e., the legal prescriptions that must be taken
into account when engaging in international business, we see a similar de-
velopment. U.S. antitrust law no longer monopolizes the picture. When
Kingman Brewster wrote his book, that structure consisted almost exclu-
sively of U.S. antitrust law. No longer. U.S. antitrust law continues to play
an important role, primarily because of the size and importance of the U.S.
4United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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market, but it is now merely one among many sets of rules and norms that
comprise the relevant normative structure. There are now more than eighty
countries with some form of competition law. Not all are of general sig-
nificance for international business and their advisers, but several are, and
in the aggregate they certainly are. The competition law of the European
Union is in many ways as important as is the law of the U.S., and each of its
members has its own competition law, several of which (most notably,
German competition law) play important roles in many international busi-
ness contexts. Moreover, the antitrust law of Japan has gained greatly in
significance and impact in recent years, and even in Latin America compe-
tition law is being taken more seriously.
This means that the bureaucrats, judges and lawyers that administer,
apply and manipulate these laws have acquired new and greatly expanded
roles in relation to international business. In Brewster's world, the only
people and institutions that counted very much were American -- U.S.
judges, administrators and lawyers. Today that group is merely a subset of
the international antitrust community -- still the most influential subset, but
a relatively small subset nevertheless. Firms engaging in international
business must, or should, pay every bit as much attention to what competi-
tion law decision makers in Brussels, Luxembourg, Tokyo and Berlin do
and say as they pay to what their analogues in the United States say and do.
But these immensely important changes are only part of the story. Not
only have the normative structure and the dramatic personae changed, but
the relationships among them have also acquired profoundly important new
roles. During the 1990s, for example, cooperation among competition law
officials increased dramatically. It is now a centerpiece of the field. It is no
longer sufficient to ask "What are the rules and procedures in the potentially
relevant competition law systems?" The competent antitrust adviser must
investigate the potentially relevant jurisdictions. Questions such as the fol-
lowing become critical: "To what extent can the enforcement agencies in-
volved exchange information? Is there a positive comity agreement that
permits state A to request state B to take antitrust enforcement action to
protect the interests of state A? Do the officials involved actually use the
opportunities and the authority for cooperation that they have been granted
and, if so, how?"
The issue of relationships among jurisdictions also has a temporal, de-
velopmental component. The competent legal adviser must always ask
what processes of change are likely to influence changes that might affect
relevant decisions. This is particularly important in competition law, where
business decisions made today may be affected by antitrust law develop-
ments. Until recently, the factors influencing such changes were primarily,
often exclusively, located within the particular political and legal system
involved. Today, such factors are often imbedded in relationships among
jurisdictions. In Europe, for example, events and forces within the Euro-
pean Union are often the primary factors in developments within national
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competition law systems. Moreover, changes within those national systems
often relate directly to developments in other member states of the Union.
On a worldwide scale, international institutions such as the OECD actively
seek to bring about change within antitrust regimes, not least by establish-
ing a forum of regular interaction among decision makers within national
competition law systems, and their influence is often extensive.
Finally, the issue of whether, when, and in what form there should be
some form of "international" antitrust law has become a major topic of con-
cern. Since the mid-1990s, when the European Union announced its sup-
port for the idea of including some form of international competition law
framework within the jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization, states
and individual decision-makers in many countries have paid growing atten-
tion to this issue.5 The conflict between the U.S. and Europe that has de-
veloped on this issue cannot be ignored by anyone who seeks to understand
the forces at work in the field of international antitrust law.
Waller's book reflects these changes in the competition law context of
international business. Its sheer size (roughly five times longer than the
original) and its loose-leaf format indicate that it is a very different kind of
work than was Brewster's first edition. The table of contents makes the
changes apparent. Where Brewster focused almost exclusively on U.S. an-
titrust law, because that was what counted then, Waller provides treats each
of the new issues I have noted above. Designed for the U.S. market, the
book still treats U.S. extraterritoriality issues at length, but it also contains
chapters on the competition law of the European Union, on North American
competition law, and on specifically international antitrust issues (e.g.
chapter 18, Toward an InternationalAntitrust). But Waller does not merely
include new material; he adjusts the analytical focus to reflect the implica-
tions of that material. He is sensitive to the factors at work and the issues in
discussion not only in the U.S., but also in other parts of the world. He ties
U.S. concerns to this broader context in solidly conceived and often creative
ways.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSITION
The implications of these changes in the international antitrust world
are vast. The new world is multi-dimensional, where the preceding regime
had but one dimension, and thus those who operate effectively in this envi-
ronment must ask different questions than were asked before. There are
now not only substantive and procedural law issues from many jurisdictions
at play, but there are also a variety of relationships among the norm-setting
states involved. They may be cooperating in a variety of ways, developing
their legal regimes in relation to particular institutions and groups, and even
5For discussion, see David J. Gerber, The U.S.-European Conflict over the Globalization
ofAntitrust Law, NEw ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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positioning themselves with regard to possible future multilateral antitrust
regimes.
Whereas Brewster looked to the law of one jurisdiction and ask ques-
tions that were essentially the same kinds of questions as any others in U.S.
law -- i.e., what the relevant cases are and how the law is administered, the
competent legal advisor now often must take into account the laws of other
jurisdictions, and this means understanding the ways in which they operate.
Moreover, she may have to look at numerous international sites in which
antitrust concerns are discussed and influence is exercised.
For the antitrust analyst, this means the acquisition of a different set of
skills and knowledge than was the case only a few years ago. She needs to
understand not only the operation of U.S. domestic law, but also how com-
petition law is understood and applied in foreign countries. She needs to
see patterns among the array of systems involved, because she cannot know
the details of each. This, in turn, changes the focus of analysis to under-
standing the factors -- assumptions, historical forces and patterns of thought
-- on which individual decisions are based. In Europe, for example, there
are many competition law systems, but understanding commonalties in the
factors that produce these laws allows one to see their similarities and,
therefore, to navigate more effectively the antitrust waters in which they are
located.
Finally, the new situation requires sensitivity to different dynamics
than those of Brewster's antitrust world. Brewster was primarily concerned
with the political consequences of failure to bridle U.S. extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. The issues were localized to the legal and political arenas. To-
day, in contrast, the "globalization" of economic activity is driving many of
the changes, and, as a result, the issues revolve around what such forces do
and should mean for both public and private actors.
As competition becomes increasingly transnational, so do restraints on
competition. If a group of firms achieves dominance of an international
market, that dominance tends to have negative effects on each of the gov-
ernments whose nationals participate in the market -- whether as purchasers
or producers. Yet precisely because of the transnational dimensions of the
conduct, the members of this group may be in a position to avoid the con-
trols of the states involved. For example, administrators and courts in a
country where conduct causes harm or even where conduct has occurred
frequently lack authority to impose sanctions on those who have engaged in
the conduct. Even if they achieve such jurisdictional competence, they fre-
quently cannot acquire the evidence that would be necessary to take action
against those responsible.
In addition, to the extent that national decision-makers increase their
efforts to respond to the harms associated with restraints on competition,
they create an increasingly dense network of norms and institutional forces
that in themselves create compliance costs for the firms subject to them and,
indirectly, for those who purchase from such firms or compete with them.
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Moreover, national competition law systems differ greatly in the degree of
restrictiveness of their norms and, especially, in the strictness with which
they are applied and enforced. This, in turn, causes uncertainty, creates in-
centives for firms to seek "havens" in which competition law systems are
weaker, and therefore distorts the competitive process. Responses to the
problem are, in other words, part of the problem.
This type of dynamic demands knowledge of a much broader set of
developments and issues. The effective analyst needs to know more about
international economic issues, how they tend to effect private and public in-
stitutions in many parts of the world, and how decision-makers view these
developments. Often the skills necessary to interpret these situations are as
important as -- perhaps more important than -- the skills necessary to oper-
ate within the U.S. antitrust system.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENT
From the slim, single-focus first edition to the large two-volume,
multi-faceted third edition, Antitrust and American Business Abroad sym-
bolizes the fundamental changes that have taken place in the legal land-
scape of international business. These two books stand as icons of different
periods, not only because they capture the problems and issues of the re-
spective periods, but also because they provide valuable guidance in dealing
with those problems and issues.
When a field changes as rapidly as international antitrust law has
changed in recent years, assumptions, institutional structures and habits of
thought tend to lag behind the changes and to distort perceptions of the cur-
rent situation. These changes and their implications are likely to occupy
antitrust lawyers for a long time, and the more quickly they recognize the
features of the new landscape, the more effectively they are likely to re-
spond to it.
